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FIE FEDERAL DEPOSIT Insurance Improve-
mnent Act of 1991 (FDICJA) requires many
changes in bank super-vision and regulation, in-
cluding a requirement that the federal supervi-
sory agencies conduct on-site examinations of all
insured depository institutions at least once every
12 months.1 Examinations of small (assets less
than $100 million), well-capitalized banks are re-
quired only every 18 months. This legislation
reduces the discretion that feder-al bank supervi-
sors once had in scheduling bank examinations.2
Annual examinations are designed to i-educe
federal deposit insurance fund losses. Mor’e fre-
quent examinations may reveal depository insti-
tution problems that can be cor-rected before
they become more serious. In addition, more
frequent examinations may permit supervisors
to close seriously troubled institutions before
their managers make new business decisions
that increase the exposure of federal deposit
insurance funds to losses. For example, institu-
tions whose troubles have not been detected by
their supervisors could increase exposure of the
deposit insurance funds to losses by paying divi-
dends or by increasing their assets in desperate
gambles to regain solvency through favorable
outcomes on new, risky investments.
This paper investigates whether there is a
relationship between the frequency of bank cx-
amninations and losses to the Bank Insurance
Fund (BTF).’ Logically, such an association
should be based on several links between the
information gained during individual examina-
tions, actions taken by supervisors on the basis
of the information, and BIF losses associated
with the failures of individual banks. First, su-
pervisors must be able to identify the serious
troubles of failing banks before they fail. Sec-
ond, examinations of failing banks must help su-
‘Examination by state authorities may satisfy this require-
ment every other 12-month period, at the discretion of the
federal agencies. The Conference of State Bank Supervi-
sors recently agreed to general principles for the sharing of
examination duties with the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve, the federal agen-
cies that examine state-chartered banks.
‘For information on the practices of the federal bank super-
visors in scheduling examinations, see Flannery and Gut-
tentag (1980).
‘The FDIC insures the deposits of banks and savings and
loans associations but maintains BIF as a separate fund
for banks. Banks pay insurance premiums into BIF, which
then covers any losses when a bank fails. The importance
of examinations in helping supervisors identify problems
that can be corrected without failure is beyond the scope
of this paper because it deals only with banks that tailed.
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pervisors identify problems that had not been
revealed in prior reports. Third, supervisors
must be effective in changing the behavior of
banks whose problems they identify through ex-
aminations. This paper investigates whether
banks reduce their asset growth and dividends
after supervisors classify them as problem
banks.~If so, BIF losses as a percentage of total
assets at failed banks that were examined fre-
quently should be less than BIF losses as a per-
centage of total assets at failed banks that were
examined infrequently. The paper presents evi-
dence on these issues.
Because this paper uses observations for
banks that failed before passage of FDICIA, it is
limited to investigating the importance of exami-
nations in helping supervisors limit BIF losses in
the past. As such, extrapolations of the results
into the future must be made with caution. Ex-
aminations may be more important for limiting
BIF losses under FDICIA than in the past, for
the following reasons: First, examination im-
provement programs required by FDICJA may
make supervisors more effective in detecting
problems in the future through examinations.
Second, because FDICIA requires supervisors to
take prompt corrective action if the capital ra-
tios of banks fall to relatively low levels, super-
visors may now be more effective in limiting
the risk assumed by problem banks.’
THE ROLE OF EXAMINATIONS IN
BANK SUPERVISION
Bank supervision involves the oversight of
banking organizations by govet-nnient agencies
to ensure that their activities conform to regula-
tions and that they operate in a safe and sound
manner. The major purpose of hank supervision
is to prevent losses from hank failures. BIF is
likely to incur losses in a bank failure, and
uninsured depositors will have losses unless a
failed bank is merged with a surviving bank. In
addition, failure of a bank may deprive its com-
munity of banking services. To minimize these
losses, supervisors attempt to identify banks
with moderate problems in time to indicate
changes they consider necessary to prevent
greater problems. In addition, supervisors at-
tempt to identify insolvent banks so that they
can he closed in a timely manner to prevent ad-
ditional losses to uninsured depositors and to
BIF.’
Federal banking supervisors have two main
sources of information on the condition of
banks: reports and examinations. Supervisors
require insured banks to file the quarterly
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report),
which includes a balance sheet (report of condi-
tion) and an income statement (report of income).
‘I’he Call Report forms are changed when bank-
ing supervisors determine that additional infor-
mation would help them monitor the condition
of banks or fulfill their other supervisory obli-
gations.
The major limitation of the Call Report for
monitoring the condition of banks is that some
of the most important information can be veri-
fied only through on-site examinations by super-
visory officials. For example, information on
the quality of loans is veiy important because
loan losses are a major cause of bank failures.
Although banks are required to disclose some
information on the quality of their loans in the
Call Report—those that are 30 days or more
past due and nonaccrual loans—super-visors read-
ing these reports at a distance cannot vouch for
their accuracy.7 Mot-eover, because there are no
markets for most of the assets in loan portfo-
lios, supervisors must verify the information
provided on loan quality and the adequacy of
allowances for loan losses to cover expected
4The paper focuses on the dividends and asset growth of
problem banks because under FDICIA, undercapitalized
banks must constrain their asset growth and dividends and
disclose their plans to supervisors for raising their capital
ratios. One way to raise a bank’s capital ratio is to reduce
its assets, By enacting FDICIA, Congress indicated its view
that such constraints on undercapitalized banks are impor-
tant for limiting the exposure of BIF to losses.
‘For a description of the scheme for prompt corrective ac-
tion mandated in FDICIA and anaiysis of its likely effects
on the risk assumed by troubled banks, see Gilbert (1991,
1992).
‘See chapter 10 in Benston et al. (1986) for additional dis-
cussion of supervision and examination.
‘The term nonaccrual refers to the treatment of interest due
from borrowers in bank income statements. If a borrower is
past due on loan payments, the bank continues to accrue
the interest due on the loan as income until the bank clas-
sifies the loan as nonaccrual.
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future losses by examining the information on
individual loans.’
A major focus of on-site hank examinations is
the quality of a hank’s loan portfolio. On-site
visits also permit examiners to review manage-
ment procedures and make their e~•’aluationof
the competence of hank management. Supervi-
sors consider management evaluation an irnpor-
tant part of each (-)xatnination because deficient
management practices are often a major cause
of hank failures.’ After an examination, supervi-
sors rate the qualhv of each of five aspects of
bank operation front I to 5: capital, asset quality,
managemetit, earnings and liquidity (CAIX~’IF~l~~),
\Vith I being lilt) hesl and 5 the ms’orst, Supervi-
sors also assign a composite CAMEL rating from
I to 5 to the bank, reflecting their weighting of
the ratings assigned to each of the five aspects
of bank operation. i’able I presents an interpre-
tation of composite CAMEL ratings.
Examination findings may he the basis foi su-
pervisory action. Examiners report their find-
ings to a hank’s senior officers and hoard of
directors, hut exainination reports are not inade
available to the public. If banking supervisors
indicate that loan quality is significantly worse
than ~vas indicated in past Call Reports, a bank
t~yilllikely file a revised report or adjust subse-
quent reports to reflect examiners’ evaluations.
Altcriiately, exanlinatior) 1()ports rnav focus on
deficiencies in managemenl practices. If an
exan~ination reveals unsatisfactory conditions,
supervisors have a variety of powers, such as
legally enforceable orders to cease specific
‘The allowance fcc loan and lease losses entry in the Call
Report represents an accumulation of past earnings set
aside to absorb anticipated future losses on loans that be-
come uncollectable. When a bank cannot collect from a
borrower, accounting principles call for management to
declare the loan a loss and charge it against the allowance
for loan losses. Increases in the allowance for loan losses
come out of current earnings. The relevant item in the
report of income is the provision for loan losses, which is
included among bank expenses. If a bank makes a large
provision for loan losses in a given period, current earn-
ings may be negative, thus reducing equity. See Walter
(1991) for a thorough discussion of the allowance for loan
losses.
‘See Graham and Homer (1988).
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BANKS IN THE STUDY
This study investigates the effectiveness of su-
pervisor’y examinations in identifying the proh-
lems of 815 banks that failed between 1985 and
1990 and the effectiveness of supervisors in con-
Table 2 indicates that most of the banks in
the study were relatively small: 59 percent had
total assets less than $25 million when they
failed, and about 94 percent had total assets less
than $100 million. Of the failed banks in hank
holding companies, only two were in organiza-
tions with total banking assets over- SI billion,
‘°Afew of the banks that failed in the years 1985—90 are ex-
cluded because of missing data on the Call Report. Six-
teen banks are excluded because they were involved in
mergers within two years of their failure dates; mergers
distort observations of asset growth. This study excludes
data for 88 bank subsidiaries of six bank holding companies
in Texas because the BIF losses attributed to some of
these banks reflected problems at their affiliates, Of the
remaining banks, 39 are excluded because they were in
operation less than three years when they failed, thus limit-
ing the periods for measuring the frequency of exami-
nations,
practices or to remove officers from bank oper-
ations, to force bankers to change their prac-
tices. In each case, supervisors try to prevent
the failure of a bank or, if the bank ultimately
fails, to limit the size of the loss to BIF and
uninsured depositors.
straining the subsequent asset grow-tb and divi-
dend payments of these problem banks. Some
of the banks that failed in those years are ex-
cluded from the study because of missing data
and problems in relating BIF losses to their
characteristics before failure.’°
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and none was in an organization with total as-
sets over $10 billion.
The failed banks were heavily concentrated in
certain regions, with about 57 percent in Ar-kan-
sas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. Of the 815
failures, 646 (nearly 80 percent) were resolved
through purchase and assumption transactions,
in which other banks purchased some of the as-
sets of the failed banks and assumed their liabil-
ities. The FDIC resolved another 13 percent of
the cases through transfer of the insured depos-
its of failed banks to other banks. In these cases,
the FDIC liquidated the failed banks’ assets and
made partial payments to uninsured depositors,
based on the proceeds of liquidated assets and
premiums paid by the banks that assumed the
insured deposits. Failed hanks were liquidated
in the remaining 61 cases.
‘table 2 reports that about 62 percent of the
banks in this study were examined at least once
in their last 12 months of operation. Thus a
substantial minority of the failed banks were
not examined in their last year of operation.
About 88 percent of the banks in this study
were examined at least once in their last 18
months of operation. Examinations of state-
chartered banks include those by state banking
authorities, the Federal Reserve and the FIMC.
Supervisors downgraded the CAMEL ratings
of some banks to 5 between their last examina-
tions and failure dates. These changes in CAMEL
ratings are called interim changes. A supervisor
changes a bank’s CAMEL rating on an interim
hasis without an examination on the basis of in-
formation that indicates a substantial change in
the condition of the bank. Because this paper
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focuses on the value of supervisory examina-
tions, interim changes in CAMEL ratings are ex-
cluded from the analysis except where noted.
Table 2 also presents the distribution of the
longest periods between examinations for all
failed banks, using data on examinations hack to
the late 1970s. Although the longest period be-
tween examinations was two years or less at
about 64 percent of the banks, 110 banks (about




If frequent examinations are important for
limiting losses to BIF, examinations must provide
supervisors with important information about
the problems of banks that is not available from
other sources. In addition, after identifying
probleni banks through examinations, supervi-
sors must be effective in preventing actions that
would increase BIF losses. This section inves-
tigates how effective bank supervisors are in
identifying troubled banks through examinations
and in constraining the behavior of problem
banks. The next section examines the direct




Did supervisors identify the serious problems
of failed banks through examinations? If ex-
aminers have little ability to distinguish betxveen
healthy and ti-oubled banks, more frequent ex-
aminations are not likely to make supervisors
more effective in limiting BIF losses.
Banks with CAMEL ratings of 4 or 5 are
called problem banks, indicating a relatively
high probability that they will fail in the near
future (table 1). Of the 815 banks in this study,
75 (about 9 percent) had CAMEL ratings of I, 2
or 3 on their last examinations.” Thus the in-
formation that triggered the closure of these 75
banks did not come from examinations. Although
examinations indicated serious problems in
more than 90 percent of the banks that eventu-
ally failed, there is room for improvement in the
detection of problems through examinations.’~
More frequent examinations will probably in-
crease the proportion of failed banks identified
as problem banks on their last examinations,
even without improvements in the quality of ex-
aminations. Only 10 of the 75 banks (13.3 per-
cent) rated CAMEL 1, 2 or 3 on their last
examinations were examined within one year of
closing, whereas 67.3 percent of the banks rated
CAMEL 4 or S on their last examinations were
examined within one year of closing.’~
Importance of Examinations in
Detecting Problems
That supervisors rated most failed banks as
problem banks in examinations before failure
does not necessarily indicate that examinations
were important in detecting the problems of
these banks. For example, problems cited in ex-
amination reports may have been revealed in
Call Reports before the on-site examinations.
This section investigates whether examinations
helped supervisors identify problems that had
not been revealed in Call Reports.
Table 3 includes data for 473 banks that had
their CAMEL ratings downgraded to 4 or 5 and
remained in operation at least one year after
the rating changes. Changes in equity/total assets
ratios of these banks—a measure of solvency
from the Call Report—were negative on average
and significantly different from zero in each of
the three quarters just before the examinations
that resulted in ratings reductions (critical ex-
aminations). Befot-e these examinations, there-
fore, changes in the equity/total assets ratios of
these banks indicated the deterioration of their
“Of these 75 banks, 31 were rated CAMEL 1 or 2 on their
last examinations. French (1991) concludes that a CAMEL
rating of 3 shortly before failure, instead of a4or 5, indi-
cates that the examination process did not detect the
severity of the problems. See French for another investiga-
tion of the effectiveness of examiners in detecting problems
of banks before their failure. Also see Benston (1973) and
Bovenzi, Marino and McFadden (1983) for analysis of
CAMEL ratings before bank failure.
‘2An analysis by Bowsher (1990), p. 16, of the General Ac-
counting Office, found a similar percentage of banks iden-
tified as problem banks before their failure. Bowsher
presents the following analysis: Because a bank’s finan-
cial condition does not deteriorate overnight, the regulatory
supervision process should detect an emerging problem
bank before its imminent failure. Of the 406 banks that
failed in the last two years, however, we found that 22
failed without ever appearing on the problem bank list and
that nine failed after appearing on the list for only one
quarter.”
“The difference in these proportions (0.673 vs. 0.133) is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistic =
12.61).









conditions. ‘Ihe mean decline of 1.31 percentage those quarters to cover current or anticipated
points in equity/total asset ratios in the quar- loan losses.” The observations in table 3 are
ters ot the critical examinations, however, is sig- consistent with the ‘dew that examiners identi
nificantly different from the means of the tied problims that had not been reflected in
percentage changes in quarter before or after these banks’ balance sheets before the critical
the critical examinations. The relatively large examinations.
declines in equity/total assets ratio in critical
examination quarters indicate that the banks in A rise in nonperforming loans (NPL5) in Call
this study made relativcly large provisions in Repoits at the time of critical examination is
‘4The relatively large declines in equity/total assets ratios in When supervisors first give a bank a CAMEL rating of 4
the quarters before the examinations also may reflect the or 5, they often examine the bank again within a few quar-
timing of the examinations. U examiners finish their work ters. The relatively large average decline in equity/total as
early in a quarter, the bank may not have filed its Call sets ratios three quarters after the banks were first rated
Report for the prior quarter. In some cases supervisors re- CAMEL 4 or 5 may reflect the effects of these follow up
quire banks to refile their most recent Call Reports after examinations. Of the 473 banks included in the calculations
examinations. The declines in equity/total assets ratios in of table 3 97 were examined three quarters after the ex-
the quarters before the examinations may reflect problem aminations that resulted in ratings reductions to CAMEL 4
loans or loan losses identified by the examiners. or 5.
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another indicator that examinations help super-
visors discover problems not disclosed in prior
Call Reports. In table 3 the means of the changes
in the NPL/total assets ratios were positive and
significantly different from zero in the quarters
just before the examinations. The mean change
in NPL/total assets ratios, however, was larger in
each of the first two quarters after the critical
exannnations than in the quarters before the
examinations.” The ielatively small increases in
NPL/total asset ratios in the critical examination
quarters reflect some NPLs charged off as losses
in those quarters}~These comparisons are con-
sistent with greater accuracy in the reporting of
nonperforming loans after banks are examined
and their CAMEL ratings are downgraded to 4
or ~5~7
Finally, the timing of reductions in ratios of
equity to total assets to relatively low levels in-
dicates the importance of examinations for ac-
curate data on bank capital ratios. Most banks
in this study reported balance sheets with rela-
tively low capital ratios only after examinations
in which their CAMEL ratings were downgrad-
ed to 4 or 5. Based on data for the three years
before failure dates, only 76 of the 815 failed
banks (9.3 percent) had their ratios of equity to
total assets fall below 5 percent more than one
quarter before these critical examinations. In
contrast, 133 of the 815 banks had their equity/
total assets ratios fall below 5 percent in the
quarters of the critical examinations, and an ad-
ditional 62 banks had their equity/total assets
ratios fall below 5 percent in the quarters be-
foie these examinations, for a total of 195
banks (23.9 percent). In some cases the effects
of examinations on equity/total assets ratios are
recorded just before the quarters in which the
banks were examined.13 The timing of declines
in equity/total assets ratios to relatively low 1ev-
els is consistent with the view that examinations
revealed information about problems that banks
had not disclosed in their Call Reports.
Effectiveness in Constraining the
Behavior of Problem Banks
Examinations are important for limiting BIF
losses if they disclose the problems of banks
with relatively high chances of failure and if
bank supervisors are effective in constraining
behaviors at problem banks that would tend to
increase the exposure of BIF to losses. This sec-
tion investigates whether banks tend to reduce
their asset growth and dividends after critical
examinations.
Why look at asset growth and dividends?
This paper does not attempt to prove that con-
straints on asset growth and dividend payments
at problem banks limit BIF losses. Instead, these
constraints are taken from FDICIA, which re-
quires supervisors to constrain the asset growth
and dividends of undercapitalized banks. This
section examines whether supervisors were
effective before passage of FDICIA in imposing
on problem banks the types of constraints that
they are required to impose on undercapitalized
banks under FDICIA.
Changes in asset growth and dividends
after examinations. Table 3 indicates that
banks tend to reduce the growth rates of their
assets and reduce dividends after supervisors
downgrade their CAMEL ratings to 4 or 5. The
mean of the growth rate of total assets of the
banks discussed in table 3 in the year ending in
the quarter of the critical examination minus
the growth rate of total assets in the following
year is about 20 percentage points, which is sig-
nificantly different from zero.
‘5Bowsher (1990), pp. 15—16, reports that the staff of the
General Accounting Office found evidence of this associa-
tion between the timing of examinations and disclosure of
NPLs. ‘Although we did not review the overall quality of
Call Reports, we found examples in reviewing certain
problem banks that suggest Call Report accuracy often de-
pends on whether there has been a recent examination by
the bank regulators. Generally, we found that the regulators
reported that these institutions had understated the level of
nonperforming loans in their Call Report submissions and
thus had established inadequate levels of loss reserves
and had overstated interest income and net income.”
‘6Banks that had their CAMEL ratings downgraded from 1 or
2 to 3 had significant declines in equity/total assets ratios
and significant increases in NPL/total assets ratios in
quarters just before critical examinations but not in critical
examination quarters. These observations are consistent
with the view that downgrades of CAMEL ratings to 3 mdi-
came that examiners recognized the deterioration in the
condition of the banks after problems had already been
revealed in Call Reports, not that examiners discovered
previously unreported problems through examinations.
“Critics of bank examinations maintain that supervisors
could monitor the condition of banks more efficiently by
monitoring reports and examining banks less frequently.
See Benston (1973), pp. 64—69, and Benston et al (1986),
pp. 245—71. Results in table 3 indicate that examinations
are important for ensuring the accuracy of data on bank
balance sheets and income statements. With less frequent
examinations, Call Reports would provide less accurate in-
formation on the condition of banks, It is not appropriate
therefore to use past banking data to draw conclusions
about how efficiently supervisors could use reports to mo-
nitor the condition of banks if supervisors examined banks
less frequently.
“See footnote 14.
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Effects of changes in CAMEL ratings on divi-
dends are investigated for 233 banks (of the
473) that paid dividends in at least one of the
four quarters before their critical examinations.
The mean of the differences in the dividend ra-
tios before and after critical examinations is
positive and significantly different from zero.
The mean change in the dividend ratio implies
that a bank with total assets of $50 million as of
the examination date would reduce its dividends
by $146,000 in the four quarters after the criti-
cal examination, relative to dividends paid in the
previous four quarters.’9
How large are dividend payments by
problem banks? Another way to look at the
effectiveness of supervisors in constraining divi-
dend payments by undercapitalized or problem
banks is to estimate how much their dividend
payments added to BIF losses when they failed.
Because dividend payments reduce the capital
cushion available to absorb losses, each dollar of
dividends paid by an undercapitalized or prob-
lem bank may be assumed to increase BIF losses
by a dollar when the bank fails.20 BIF losses
caused by dividend payments by undercapital-
ized and problem banks are estimated for the
815 banks in this study. Using data for the last
three years of each bank’s operations, dividend
payments made by banks in quarters in which
their equity/total assets ratios were below 4 per-
cent or their CAMEL ratings were 4 or 5 are
summed over all 815 banks. The 4 percent cutoff
for the equity/total assets ratio is based on the
provision in FDICIA that forbids dividend pay-
ments that would make a bank undercapitalized.
‘Fhe supervisory definition of undercapitalized
includes a ratio of tier I capital (essentially the
same as equity) to total assets below 4 percent.
The sum of dividends paid by the 815 banks
while undercapitalized or rated CAMEL 4 or 5
is 0.8 percent of BIF losses incurred in resolving
the failures of the 815 banks. Thus although su-
pervisors have allowed some banks to pay divi-
dends while their capital ratios were low or
they were classified as problem banks, eliminat-
ing dividend payments in such circumstances
would have produced a relatively small reduc-
tion in BIF losses.
More on the effects of CAMEL ratings
on asset growth. One limitation of the analy-
sis in table 3 of how changes in CAMEL ratings
affect asset growth is that the failed banks as a
group tend to reduce the growth rates of their
assets as they approach failure, as shown in
panel A of figure 1. The change in asset growth
reported in table 3 therefore represents a mix-
ture of effects: banks getting closer to failure
and banks subject to changes in the degree of
pressure from their supervisors to raise capital
ratios.
Panel B of figure 1 sepamates these effects on
asset growth by comparing the mean growth
rates of assets at banks with different CAMEL
ratings from 10 quarters up to one quarter be-
fore their failures. For each lag, the mean growth
rate of assets is significantly lower for banks
rated CAMEL 4 or 5 than for those rated CAMEL
1 or 2. Figure 1 therefore indicates that after
adjusting for the time to failure, growth rates of
assets are lower for the banks rated CAMEL 4
and 521 These results are consistent with the
view that supervisors were effective in con-
straining the asset growth of banks they identi-
fied as problem banks.
“See Spong (1990), pp. 64—71, for a description of the poi-
icies of federal bank supervisors regarding dividend pay-
ments by banks before FDICIA. Banks that had their
CAMEL ratings downgraded to 3 did not have significant
declines in the growth rates of total assets in the four
quarters following their examinations. Those that paid divi-
dends in the four quarters before the examinations, how-
ever, had significant reductions in dividends in the four
quarters following the downgrades in their CAMEL ratings
to 3.
2cln some cases undercapitalized or problem banks received
capital injections from shareholders around the time they
paid dividends. The dividend payments may have been im-
portant for maintaining the confidence of shareholders in
the viability of these banks. In these cases the assumption
of a one-to-one relationship between dividends and BIF
losses may overstate the effects of dividends.
21Numbers above and below the bars in panel B of figure 1
are the numbers of banks used in calculating the mean
growth rates of total assets. Panel B in figure 1 reflects in-
terim changes in CAMEL ratings, as well as CAMEL rat-
ings established through examinations. Banks are excluded
from the calculations of mean growth rates of assets in
those quarters in which their CAMEL ratings were changed.
Suppose, for instance, a bank had its CAMEL rating down-
graded from 3 to 5 four quarters before its failure. The
growth rate of that bank would not be included among the
growth rates of CAMEL 4 and $ banks four quarters before
their failures, but the growth rate of that bank would be
included among the CAMEL 4 and 5 banks three, two and
one quarters before failure. This exclusion eliminates any
initial effect of a change of CAMEL rating on asset growth,
indicating instead the continuing effects of differences in
CAMEL ratings on asset growth after the initial changes.
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Average Growth Rates of Total Assets (All 815 Banks)
Mean Percentage Change in Assets
Quarter before Failure
Average Growth Rates of Total Assets for Banks with Different CAMEL Ratings
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Data presented in the preceding sections sug-
gest a relationship between BIF losses and the
frequency of examination before bank failure.
The evidence indicates that examinations helped
supervisors identify problem banks that ulti-
tnately failed. Moreover, supervisors appear to
have constrained the asset growth and dividend
payments of banks identified as problem banks
through examinations. Together, these results
suggest that more frequent examinations should
result in lower BIF losses.
It is possible, however, to develop another
hypothesis that implies the opposite sign on the
relationship between the frequency of examina-
tions and BIF loss/total assets ratios. Suppose su-
pervisors examine more frequently the banks
Examinations Near Time of Failure
Table 4 compares average BIF loss/total assets
ratios at banks examined at least once in their
last 12 months of operation with those of failed
banks not examined during their last year of
22An attempt to identify empirically the determinants of the
timing of examinations yielded insignificant results. The
dependent variable in a probit regression equation was a
dummy variable with a value of unity if a bank was exa-
mined in a given quarter, zero otherwise. Independent vari-
ables included CAMEL ratings on prior examinations, time
since the prior examinations, capital ratios and measures
of asset quality for several quarters just before the current
quarter, the bank’s federal supervisory agency, year of the
examination and region. Only a few of the independent
variables were significant, and the overall equation had in-
significant explanatory power. These results do not support
the hypothesis that the timing of examinations varies syste-
matically with information available to supervisors on the
condition of banks before examinations.
FREQUENCY OF EXAMINATIONS
AND BIF LOSSES
they consider to have more severe problems
and allow banks they consider relatively sound
to operate for longer periods between examina-
tions. If supervisors schedule examinations ac-
cording to their estimates of the financial
strength of banks and if those estimates are ac-
curate, the banks with relatively high BIF
loss/total assets ratios when they fail would be
among those examined most frequentiv.22 The
nature of the relationship between the frequency
of examinations and BIF loss/total assets ratios
therefore must be settled by examining the data.
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operation. The average BIF loss/total assets ratio
is almost 4 percentage points higher for the
banks riot examined in their last year of opera-
tion, and the difference in these mean BIF
loss/total assets ratios is statistically significant
(t-statistic = 4.17). The difference is also eco-
nomically significant. For a bank with total as-
sets of $50 million as of its failure date, this
difference would increase the BIF loss by $1.96
million.23
This comparison of BIF loss/total assets ratios
based on frequency of examination does not
necessarily indicate that 12 months is a critical
frequency for examinations. Perhaps BIF loss/total
assets ratios are higher only for the banks not
examined for longer periods before failure, such
as their last 18 to 24 months of operation. To
explore such a possibility, table 4 also presents
the average BIF loss/total assets ratio for banks
not examined in their last 18 months, which is
about the same as the average BIF loss/total assets
ratio for those banks not examined in their last
12 months. Lack of information from examina-
tions in the last 12 months of operations at
failed banks appears to hinder the effectiveness
of supervisors in limiting BIF losses.
Longest Period Between
Examinations
Comparisons in the top half of table 4 may
not capture all of the relevant information
about the effects of infrequent examinations on
BIF loss/total assets ratios. Some banks that went
several years between examinations were exa-
mined frequently just before being closed. In
these cases, the problems that led to failure and
relatively large BIF loss/total assets ratios may
have gone undetected for several years because
of infrequent examinations until near the time
of failure.
To capture this additional aspect of examina-
tion frequency, the longest period between ex-
aminations is identified for each bank. Data on
the dates of examinations are available back to
the late 1970s. Table 4 presents the distribution
of the 815 banks by their longest period between
examinations. The mean BIF loss/total assets
ratio for each group of banks is not significantly
different from the mean for each of the other
groups. BIF loss/total assets ratios are therefore
not related to the length of time between exami-
nations. These observations, however, should not
be interpreted as evidence against the require-
ment of annual examinations. Without regular
examinations, supervisors cannot determine
which banks should be classified as problem
banks and therefore subject to closer supervision.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Table 5 indicates that the proportions of failed
banks subject to examinations in their last year
vary by region and by federal supervisory agen-
cy. For instance, only 45.3 percent of national
banks [supervised by the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (0CC)] were examined in
their last year. In Texas on! one-third of the
national banks were examined in their last year.24
23The staff of the House Banking Committee (U.S. Congress,
1991) concludes that annual examinations are important for
reducing BIF losses. Their conclusion is based on the fol-
lowing observation. The supervisory agencies that subject
higher percentages of the banks under theiriurisdiction to
annual examinations have lower ratios of BIF losses by
failed banks to the total assets of all banks under their
jurisdiction.
24The staff of the House Banking Committee (U.S. Congress,
1991) reports disparities similar to those in tableS among
the federal bank supervisory agencies in the percentages
of banks subject to annual examinations.
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The association between BIF loss/total assets
ratios and examinations in the last years of
operations presented in table 4 may actually
reflect regional influences, practices of federal
supervisors or the effects of other variables that
are correlated with proportions of banks ex-
amined in their last year. Using multiple regres-
sion analysis, this study estimates the association
between examinations and BIF loss/total assets
ratios, holding constant the influences of other
determinants of BIF loss/total assets ratios that
may be correlated with the frequency of exami-
nations.
In the regression analysis, the dependent vari-
able is the loss to BIF divided by total assets as
of the failure date. The equation is estimated
with observations for bank failure cases resolved
through purchase and assumption (P&A). In a
P&A case, a solvent bank purchases some of the
assets of a failed bank and assumes its liabilities.
Banks that assume the liabilities of failed banks
in P&A cases purchase some of their assets and
receive cash from the FDIC in the amount of the
difference between the assets purchased and lia-
bilities assumed. Banks bid for a failed bank in
terms of premiums, and the cash payment to
the winning bidder is net of the premium.
Of the sample of 815 failed banks, about 80
percent were resolved through P&A. The ap-
propriate regression models would be different
for the other cases, which were resolved through
transfer of insured deposits or liquidation. In
particular, BIF shares its losses with uninsured
depositors in the cases resolved through trans-
fer of insured deposits or liquidation. Also, the
coefficients on regional dummy variables may
vary by resolution method because failed banks
are more valuable to potential bidders for P&.A
if state law perniits the winning bidders to re-
open the offices of the failed banks as their
branches. In states that restrict branching, win-
ning bidders must consolidate the assets and lia-
bilities of the failed banks at their existing
offices.
For bank failure cases resolved through P&.A,
RIF loss can be specified as follows:
BIF loss = Decline in the value of assets below
book values
(1)
(New worth + the allowance for
loan losses)
— Premium
The net worth of a failed bank plus its allowance
for loan losses is a buffer for the FDIC as receiver
of a failed bank because declines in the value of
bank assets relative to their book values may be
charged against net woith and the allowance
for loan losses before BIF absorbs any losses.
The premium paid by the winning bidder in a
P&A case reduces the loss to BIF. In the regres-
sion equation, the ratio of BIF losses to total assets
is estimated as a function of several indepen-
dent variables selected to reflect the items in
equation (1), which are identified in table 6.
Idealification of Independent
Variables
Net worth plus allowance for loan losses.
Banks with larger net worth and allowance for
loan losses at the time of failure tend to have
lower BIF losses, as indicated in equation (1).
The independent variable included to capture
this effect is C—equity plus the allowance for
loan losses on the last Call Report, all divided by
total assets as of the failure date—which is
assumed to have a negative coefficient.
Frequency of examinations. A dummy
variable for banks examined in their last 12
months (LIZ) is included as a measure of the
frequency of examinations. The book values of
assets at banks examined in their last 12 months
of operation are assumed to approximate more
closely the values of the assets to the FDIC as
receiver than the book values of banks not exa-
mined in their last 12 months of operation.
Thus the percentage declines in the value of as-
sets relative to book values will tend to be
smaller for banks examined in their last 12
months of operation. The coefficient on E12 is
therefore assumed to be negative.
Decline in the value of securities rela-
tive to book value. In the Call Report, banks
value securities at book values in the balance
sheet but report the market value of their secu-
rities as a separate item. When a bank fails, the
decline in the value of securities relative to book
values is assumed to be proportional to the gap
between the market value and book value of
securities on the last Call Report. The following
variable is included as a measure of the gap be-
tween the market value and book value of secu-
rities: MARKEr—a variable that equals the book
value of securities minus their market value list-
ed on the last Call Report, all divided by total
assets as of the failure date.
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Decline in the value of loans relative to
book value. The gap between the book value
of loans before failure and the value of the
loans to the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank is
assumed to be related to measures of loan qual-
ity derived from Call Reports filed before failute.
To the extent that the measures of loan quality
derived from Call Reports are accurate, the lar-
gest declines in the value of loans relative to
book values are likely to be among the loans
identified before failure as poor-quality loans.
The following measures of loan quality are as-
sumed to have positive coefficients.
NPL = Loans and leases 90 days or more
past due plus nonaccrual loans, all
divided by total assets as of failure
ACCRUED = Interest on loans that had been ac-
crued as income, but not received
as of the last Call Report, divided
by total assets as of failure date
ORED = Real estate owned (other than
bank premises) according to the
last Call Report, divided by total
assets as of the failure date
These variables reflect bank accounting prac-
tices. When borrowers fall behind on their con-
tracted loan payments to a bank, the bank
continues to accrue the interest it is due as cur-
rent income until the bank classifies the loan as
nonaccrual. Thus the variable NPL reflects the
book value of both categories of loans. The van- date
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able ACCRUED reflects interest accrued but not
paid to the bank by its borrowers. The variable
OREO, which reflects ]oan defaults, tends to rise
as borrowers default on their loans and banks
take possession of real estate their borrowers
had pledged as collateral. In the Call Report,
foreclosed real estate is valued at the lower of
the unpaid balances of loans on which borrow-
ers defaulted or the fair market value of the
real estate.
Composition of deposits as a determinant
of premiums The hypothesized sign on the
following variable would depend on the method
used by the FDIC to resolve a bank failure case.
IDR = Last data available on deposits in
accounts up to $100,000 each,
divided by total assets as of the
failure date.
For cases resolved through liquidation, the
hypothesized sign on this variable would be
positive. In liquidation cases, the FDIC provides
full coverage for insured depositors but shares
losses with uninsured depositors. Thus losses to
BIF would be higher in those liquidation cases
in which the ratio IDR is higher, holding the
other determinants of BIF losses constant.
In P&,A cases, in contrast, the FDIC does not
share losses with uninsured depositors because
the winning bidder in a P&.A case assumes all
of the deposit liabilities of a failed hank. The
sign on IDR in P&A cases is hypothesized to be
negative because bidders in P&A cases tend to
bid higher premiums for banks with higher ra-
tios of fully insured deposits to total assets.25
Fully insured deposits are valuable to bidders
because banks tend to pay relatively low in-
terest rates on fully insured deposits.2°
Asset growth. Panel B of figure 1 indicates
that the banks identified as problem banks had
sharper declines in their assets than other
banks as they approached failur-e. These
differential rates of asset growth tend to bias
the BIF loss/total assets ratios of the banks iden-
tified as problem banks upward by reducing the
denominators in these ratios. The variable
GROWTH is included as an independent varia-
ble to adjust for such a bias. GROWTH is the
change in a bank’s total assets in the 12 months
ending with its failure, divided by total assets as
of its failure date. GROWTH is expected to have
a negative sign because the effect of an increase
(decrease) in assets in the last year on the BIF
loss/total assets ratio is assumed to be pi-irnarily
an increase (decrease) in the denominator of
this ratio.
Dividends The coefficient on DIV—dividends
in the last year divided by total assets as of the
failure date—may be positive for two reasons.
First, dividends are payments of capital to share-
holders that leave less capital to absorb reduc-
tions in asset value. Second, dividends may sig-
nal that shareholders saw little reason to
attempt to prevent failure. Indeed, they may
have paid out capital in anticipation of failure.
Federal supervisory agency. The primary
supervisor of nationally chartered banks is the
0CC. ‘The Federal Reserve supervises state-
chartered banks that are members of the Feder-
al Reserve System, whereas the FDIC supervises
the remaining state-chartered banks. Differences
in supervisory practices among these agencies
may affect BIF losses in ways not accounted for
by the other independent variables. Dummy
variables (0CC and FR) are included to capture
such effects.
Bank size. James (1991) found that FDIC ad-
ministrative costs were higher per dollar of as-
sets for small failed banks. BIF loss/total assets
ratios therefore may be higher fot small banks.
The bank size variable is the natural log of total
assets as of failure date.
Location and year of failure. Dummy vari-
ables for the regions of failed banks and the
years in which they failed are included as the
remaining independent variables. BIF loss/total
assets ratios may vary systematically by region
and year of failure. Table 2 identifies the
abbreviations for regions.
Regression Results
The coefficient on C in table 7, which is nega-
tive and statistically significant, is also signifi-
cantly different from minus one. Equation (1),
however, implies a coefficient of negative unity
for C. i’he deviation of the coefficient on C
from negative unily probably reflects the fact
that observations for equity and the allowance
255ee James (1991). Berkovec and Liang (1991) found that
premiums paid by winning bidders in bank failure cases
were positively related to core deposits, measured as
transactions deposits and savings deposits.
26See Brunner, Duca and McLaughlin (1991).
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for loan losses used in deriving the vaiiable C
were from the last Call Reports, which were
filed several months before the failure dates.
There were probably substantial chargeoffs of
loan losses against the allowance for loan losses
and against equity between the dates of the last
Call Reports and failure dates.
The coefficient on E12 in table 7 is negative
and statistically significant, indicating lower BIF
loss/total assets ratios for banks examined in
their last 12 months of operation, holding other
factors constant. The size of the coefficient on
E12, however, implies an effect of examination
in the last year on BIF loss/total assets ratios
that is about half of the effect in table 4, which
does not hold constant other determinants of
BIF loss/total assets ratios.
The coefficient on MARKET is not significant.
The three measures of loan quality (NPL, AC-
CRUED and OREO) have positive and statistically
significant coefficients.
The negative, significant coefficient on IDR in-
dicates that failed banks with higher ratios of
fully insured deposits to total assets are more
valuable to potential bidders in P&A cases. The
coefficient on GROWTH is negative and signifi-
cant, as hypothesized, whereas the coefficient
on DIV is not significant.
The coefficient on 0CC is not significant in
this equation and is not significant with the
variable LiZ excluded as an independent varia-
ble. Table 5 indicates that a relatively low pro-
portion of national banks were examined in
their last year. Correlation between 0CC and
EU, however, does not account for the insig-
nificance of the coefficient on 0CC in the equa-
tion reported in table 7. The coefficient on FR
indicates no significant effect of Federal Reserve
membership on the BIF loss/total assets ratios of
state-chartered banks, holding the other indepen-
dent variables constant.
‘I’he coefficient on the natural log of total as-
sets does not support the hypothesis of higher
BIF loss/total assets ratios for small failed banks.
The coefficients on dummy variables for in-
dividual years are not statistically significant.
The negative, significant coefficients on some of
the regional dummy variables indicate that,
holding other independent variables constant,
BIF loss/total assets ratios were significantly lower
for banks in several regions than for those in
the West South Central region, the excluded
region.
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IS 18 MONTHS TOO LONG
BETWEEN EXAMINATIONS?
This paper provides empirical support for the
requirements in FDICIA for frequent examina-
tions. This section deals with the implications of
the exemption for small, well-capitalized banks,
which must be examined only once every 18
months. Given the importance of examinations
in identifying problem banks and limiting BIF
losses, is 18 months too long between examina-
tions for relatively small, well-capitalized banks?
The answer depends on the objective of su-
pervisors in conducting examinations. The issue
of how many failures would be prevented
without this exemption is beyond the scope of
this paper. A major objective of supervision is
to identify the banks with serious problems and
to prevent them from taking actions that would
increase the exposure of BIF to losses. Given
this objective, one way to determine the ap-
propriate length of time between examinations
is to determine how many banks failed within
is months of examinations in which they met
the following criteria:
1. Total assets less than $100 million
2. Equity/total assets ratios greater than 6 per-
cent (the level recently set as an indicator of
a well-capitalized bank)
3. CAMEL rating of I on the examination
FDICIA states that banks that may be examined
only once every 18 months must have compos-
ite ratings of outstanding on their last examina-
tions.2’
Of the 815 banks in this study, 124 met these
three conditions at least once in the quarters in
which they were examined. Only three of the
124 banks failed within 18 months of these ex-
amination dates, all in 1987. These observations
indicate that few cases of serious problems in
banks will go undetected by supervisors be-
cause of the 18-month exemption for small,
well-capitalized banks.
CONCLUSIONS
FDIC1A requires that federal supervisors of in-
sured depository institutions examine each of
these institutions annually. Small, well-capitalized
institutions need to he examined only once ev-
ery 18 months. The purpose for this provision
in FDICIA is to reduce deposit insurance fund
losses.
Evidence in this paper supports the argument
that the requirement of annual examinations
will reduce losses of BIF. Most of the failed
banks in this study were identified through ex-
aminations as problem banks before their
failure, and examinations helped supervisors
identify problems that had not been disclosed in
prior Call Reports. In addition, supervisors were
effective in slowing asset growth and reducing
dividends at banks identified as having serious
problems.
Losses to BIF were smaller for banks exa-
mined in their last 12 months of operation. If
the requirements for prompt corrective action
in FDICIA also make supervisors more effective
in constraining the behavior of banks classified
as problem banks, results in this paper will be
underestimates of the contributions of annual
examinations to reductions in BIF losses.
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